[afnog] afnog Digest, Vol 49, Issue 24
Global One Solution
malabow at gmail.com
Mon Apr 28 13:36:19 UTC 2008
Good discussion guys
One of my concerns is as Africa moves toward broadband and fiber-optic
Backbone, more users/companies will be doing business online, due to
experience of dealing with Denial of Service, and guys i m not talking about
virus/bots, where a patch can fix the problem, but organized DoS, that is
geared toward a government website or large corporate website. I am hoping
African ISP are building relationship with each other, and becoming part of
larger community. Can anyone share with us, what is the chosen vendor in
most African SP backbone router and Edge routers. The reason i m asking, one
has to 1st project it's core network, and edge so they are not taken out of
service. Here is few tips i would like to share.
1- Do not advertised your connected routes (this is the /30 or /31 between
the PE<>CE),
this will (a) reduce the routing table, (b) Hard for hackers to
launch attack against the /30 prefix.
2- Deploy a ACL that actually protects the control Plane of the router, in
Cisco they called Receive ACL, not sure on other vendors.
3- Deploy CoPP (Control Plane Policing)
Thanks,
On Mon, Apr 28, 2008 at 3:50 AM, <afnog-request at afnog.org> wrote:
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> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Securing our network (Global One Solution)
> 2. Re: [AfrISPA.Discuss] Securing our network (S. Oduor)
> 3. Re: [AfrISPA.Discuss] Securing our network (Global One Solution)
> 4. Re: [AfrISPA.Discuss] Securing our network (McTim)
> 5. WEEKLY BGP REPORT FOR AfriNIC v4 PREFIXES
> (airrs-report at afrinic.net)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2008 14:54:11 -0400
> From: "Global One Solution" <malabow at gmail.com>
> Subject: [afnog] Securing our network
> To: afnog at afnog.org
> Cc: discuss at afrispa.org
> Message-ID:
> <e1e7c7d20804271154l1a324805je499a43337dbd754 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> I am sure some of you have seen an article in www.bbcnews.com under the
> Technology, title: "*hackers warn high street chains*," What is Africa
> doing about security, specially the government, and the ISP's. Can anyone
> from local ISP share how they fight or if there is such a community where
> African ISP share knowledge and experience, DoS attack is getting advance,
> and hard to stop. I know in the US, we try our best to stop, in advance,
> but
> deploying tools like Ciscoguard, and other tools, that kind of pre-detects
> the health of the packet, We all though V6 would provide more security, but
> it seems that is not case. I would like to hear how other fight this nasty
> fight.
>
> Here is the article i am talking about.
>
> http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7366995.stm
>
>
> --
> Liban Mohamed
> Global One Solution
> www.globalonesolutions.net
> malabow at gmail.com
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2008 00:27:39 +0300 (EAT)
> From: "S. Oduor" <soduor at accesskenya.com>
> Subject: Re: [afnog] [AfrISPA.Discuss] Securing our network
> To: Discuss at afrispa.org
> Cc: afnog at afnog.org
> Message-ID:
> <46641.41.220.125.70.1209331659.squirrel at webmail.accesskenya.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain;charset=iso-8859-1
>
> > What is Africa doing about security, specially the government, and the
> ISP's. > Can anyone from local ISP share how they fight or if there is
> such a
> >community where African ISP share knowledge and experience, DoS attack is
> >getting advance, and hard to stop. I know in the US, we try our best to
> stop, in >advance, but deploying tools like Ciscoguard, and other tools,
> that kind of >pre-detects the health of the packet, We all though V6
> would provide more >security, but it seems that is not case. I would
> like to hear how other fight this
> > nasty fight.
>
> Hi,
> I would talk about this on ISP level since this is my area of expertise,
> The internet being a global community ISP's in Africa also deploy the
> same technology used in other continents to stop any sort of attacks in
> advance. One of the communities African IT engineers share knowledge and
> experience is through this mail list Afrispa and Afnog. There are several
> other malling lists available locally in my country kenya but one thing is
> that internet is a global venture I personally have subscribed to NANOG
> and much other mailling lists to share knowledge not in Africa. Besides
> that we had a group composed of several IT engineers and we would meet on
> Friday evenings for a cup of coffee and talk on matters relating to
> challenges in the vast IT industry to enhance our knowledge base geared
> upon meeting resolutions in a timely manner.
>
> To tackle a little bit on security , its impossible to offer 100 %
> security level based on any network model. On Network & Application layer
> what I operate in terms of regulating security are:-
> 1. Intrusion Prevention measures which include firewall set-ups, patching
> up of softwares discovered to have some security hole and trying much to
> stick with open-source software for a server being set-up for high
> delivery since its proven better over windows in the test of time and you
> can always find guyz ready to help you free with bugs on the global
> community.
>
> 2. Intrusion Detection which identify security flaws within the
> system/network this either sends a text msg or email alert to my phone
> seeking intervention of a flaw or suspected flaw. In worst cases of DOS
> attempt we can have all that malicious subnet dropped from both the
> network and application level automatically.
>
> 3. Awareness creation - This basically involved advising customers on best
> industry standards with respect to security.
>
> 4. Back-ups - Of course this is when the worst happens you need a
> restoration point or an alternative to ensure redundancy this is what I
> practice using automated scripts on application level and different mode's
> for the network.
>
> Above is what is mostly practiced in much African ISP's. In my scenario
> much of it t is currently going to the budget allocation to buy more
> products that have been geared with security in mind this also apply to
> application softwares that are more robust in terms or security to reduce
> the effect of this menace.
>
> Their is no direct set-up rules and procedures to govern internet crime
> in most countries. This is one thing that should be on the pipeline but it
> would eminently require lots of international support probably the UN
> level since this would harmonies international laws. Right now my country
> hopes to get fibre connection linking it to the rest of the world and the
> focus should highly shift to security with faster speeds of up to 50 ms
> unlike current not less than 600 ms which somehow deters malicious chaps
> from interest in exploits. With the fibre we will have a greater challenge
> to regulate flawlessness due to the faster speed and also because more
> people would embrace the internet to boost their business presence.
>
> Much Rgds
> Sam Oduor.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> ..:. loyalty .:..
> God said: Don't pray to other gods or even mention their names.
> Exodus 23:13
>
>
> -----------------------------------------
> This email was sent using Accesskenya Group Ltd Webmail.
> "Winner of 5 COYA Awards 2007, Now Listed on NSE: ACK !"
> http://www.accesskenya.com/
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2008 18:37:05 -0400
> From: "Global One Solution" <malabow at gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [afnog] [AfrISPA.Discuss] Securing our network
> To: Discuss at afrispa.org
> Cc: afnog at afnog.org
> Message-ID:
> <e1e7c7d20804271537w29487bd8l19d7cfd7d8553266 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Now Surge,
>
> I am sure you know well, ACL alone does not protect you ANYTHING, unless
> you
> willing to block legitimate traffic. You are really in the mercy of your
> ISP. If your ISP is not placing the ACL in the edge router, what good your
> ACL will do? all the hacker need is a way to flood your link, and they can
> take you tout of service. so let's say you even place CiscoGuard(which i
> agree it's expensive) and i m not saying this is the solution, but even if
> you place some intelligent device in behind your CE router, you will not be
> given the opportunity to study the health of the packet, since the hackers
> goal is just to take you out of service. I am really advocate a VERY close
> relationship between the *customer *and *ISP*. RTB (Remote Trigger
> Blockhole) is also another feature that kind of helps clients
>
> Good feedback Thank you
>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 27, 2008 at 5:37 PM, Serge Vondandamo <
> serge.vondandamo at orange.fr> wrote:
>
> > Please, leverage your existing Network infrastructure to protect your
> > business against DoS or DDOS attacks. Some simple but well designed ACLs
> on
> > Routers, switches; etc can help you better than a Ciscoguard (very costly
> by
> > the way).
> >
> >
> >
> > Serge Vondandamo
> >
> > CISSP, CEH, CCNA
> >
> > Sr. Security Analyst
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > *De :* Discuss-owner at afrispa.org [mailto:Discuss-owner at afrispa.org] *De
> la
> > part de* Global One Solution
> > *Envoy? :* dimanche 27 avril 2008 20:54
> > *? :* afnog at afnog.org
> > *Cc :* discuss at afrispa.org
> > *Objet :* [AfrISPA.Discuss] Securing our network
> >
> >
> >
> > I am sure some of you have seen an article in www.bbcnews.com under the
> > Technology, title: "*hackers warn high street chains*," What is Africa
> > doing about security, specially the government, and the ISP's. Can
> anyone
> > from local ISP share how they fight or if there is such a community where
> > African ISP share knowledge and experience, DoS attack is getting
> advance,
> > and hard to stop. I know in the US, we try our best to stop, in advance,
> but
> > deploying tools like Ciscoguard, and other tools, that kind of
> pre-detects
> > the health of the packet, We all though V6 would provide more security,
> but
> > it seems that is not case. I would like to hear how other fight this
> nasty
> > fight.
> >
> > Here is the article i am talking about.
> >
> > http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7366995.stm
> > * *
> >
> >
> > --
> > Liban Mohamed
> > Global One Solution
> > www.globalonesolutions.net
> > malabow at gmail.com
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Liban Mohamed
> Global One Solution
> www.globalonesolutions.net
> malabow at gmail.com
> -------------- next part --------------
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> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2008 05:34:44 +0300
> From: McTim <dogwallah at gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [afnog] [AfrISPA.Discuss] Securing our network
> To: afnog at afnog.org
> Message-ID:
> <f65fb55e0804271934g77095d07o12de038c82277433 at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>
> Mohamed,
>
> These tutorials may be helpful:
>
> http://www.nanog.org/ispsecurity.html
>
> --
> Cheers,
>
> McTim
> $ whois -h whois.afrinic.net mctim
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2008 09:30:00 +0200
> From: airrs-report at afrinic.net
> Subject: [afnog] WEEKLY BGP REPORT FOR AfriNIC v4 PREFIXES
> To: afnog at afnog.org
> Message-ID: <200804280730.m3S7U0D1006264 at airrs.afrinic.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain
>
>
>
> BGP Report for IP block : 41/8 , 196/8
> DATE : 2008-04-28
>
> BGP Report Perspective : AS2905
> Number of routing entries : 249304
>
> Allocation and whois data from RIRs statistics files and whois databases
> BGP data from : routeviews project (http://www.routeviews.org)
>
> Number of prefixes allocated from 41/8 : 223
> Minimum allocation size from 41/8 : /22
> Minimum prefix size from 41/8 in routing table : /24
>
> Number of prefixes allocated from 196/8 : 505
> Minimum allocation size from 196/8 : /24
> Minimum prefix size from 196/8 in routing table : /24
>
> Total Number of IP address allocated from AfriNIC pool(41/8) : 7944192
> Percentage of IP address allocated from AfriNIC pool(41/8) : 47.35107421875
> %
> Total Number of IP address allocated from AfriNIC legacy pool(196/8) :
> 4040960
> Percentage of IP address allocated from AfriNIC legacy pool(196/8) :
> 24.0859985351562 %
> Total Number of IP address from AfriNIC pools announced to Internet :
> 11373824
> Percentage of IP address from AfriNIC pools announced to Internet : 33.9 %
>
> Summary ( 41/8 )
> *******
>
> Prefixes allocated but not seen in the routing table
> (Exact match and more specifics)
> *****************************************************
> 46 Prefixes
>
> 41.176.0.0/16 41.178.0.0/16 41.179.0.0/16 41.199.0.0/16
> 41.202.128.0/19 41.203.32.0/19
> 41.203.96.0/19 41.203.128.0/19 41.203.160.0/20 41.203.176.0/20
> 41.203.240.0/20 41.206.0.0/19
> 41.206.64.0/19 41.206.96.0/19 41.206.224.0/19 41.211.32.0/19
> 41.212.0.0/17 41.213.128.0/17
> 41.214.0.0/17 41.221.0.0/20 41.221.112.0/20 41.221.160.0/20
> 41.221.208.0/20 41.222.64.0/21
> 41.222.72.0/21 41.222.200.0/22 41.222.208.0/22 41.222.212.0/22
> 41.222.220.0/22 41.222.224.0/22
> 41.222.228.0/22 41.222.236.0/22 41.222.240.0/22 41.223.12.0/22
> 41.223.88.0/22 41.223.160.0/22
> 41.223.164.0/22 41.223.168.0/22 41.223.172.0/22 41.223.176.0/22
> 41.223.192.0/22 41.223.196.0/22
> 41.223.212.0/22 41.223.220.0/22 41.223.224.0/22 41.223.228.0/22
>
> Prefixes seen in the routing table
> (Exact match or more specifics)
> *****************************************************
> 1173 prefixes were seen in routing table with the following distribution
>
> * 782 originated by AS in AfriNIC service region (AS and number of
> prefixes originated)
>
> AS11259 (1) AS11845 (2) AS14988 (1) AS15706 (13) AS15964 (13)
> AS16058 (1) AS16637 (28) AS17400 (2)
> AS19711 (3) AS20484 (11) AS21003 (2) AS21280 (1) AS22355 (1)
> AS23889 (14) AS24863 (126) AS25543 (1)
> AS25818 (1) AS28683 (1) AS2905 (6) AS29571 (69) AS29614 (11)
> AS29975 (22) AS30619 (5) AS30985 (1)
> AS30995 (2) AS30998 (3) AS31810 (7) AS32017 (3) AS32398 (1)
> AS32437 (1) AS33762 (10) AS33770 (10)
> AS33772 (6) AS33774 (14) AS33776 (95) AS33783 (32) AS33785 (1)
> AS33788 (1) AS36864 (1) AS36865 (4)
> AS36866 (11) AS36867 (4) AS36874 (2) AS36877 (1) AS36896 (4)
> AS36898 (11) AS36899 (1) AS36900 (1)
> AS36904 (1) AS36905 (2) AS36909 (1) AS36911 (7) AS36912 (3)
> AS36914 (5) AS36915 (20) AS36916 (2)
> AS36917 (10) AS36918 (2) AS36920 (4) AS36921 (1) AS36925 (12)
> AS36928 (3) AS36934 (1) AS36935 (2)
> AS36936 (1) AS36937 (1) AS36939 (3) AS36945 (1) AS36947 (7)
> AS36950 (6) AS36951 (1) AS36957 (1)
> AS36958 (7) AS36959 (5) AS36960 (1) AS36961 (1) AS36962 (1)
> AS36965 (1) AS36966 (1) AS36967 (1)
> AS36969 (1) AS36970 (1) AS36977 (1) AS36979 (1) AS36983 (1)
> AS36986 (1) AS36988 (1) AS36992 (4)
> AS36993 (1) AS36994 (1) AS36996 (1) AS36998 (2) AS36999 (1)
> AS37000 (1) AS37008 (2) AS37010 (1)
> AS3741 (4) AS5713 (9) AS6713 (68) AS9129 (3)
>
> * 391 originated by AS not in AfriNIC service region (AS and number
> of prefixes originated)
>
> AS10434 (1) AS12392 (1) AS12491 (1) AS12654 (1) AS15808 (8)
> AS16422 (6) AS17175 (27) AS17653 (1)
> AS17813 (2) AS20294 (2) AS21042 (9) AS22351 (34) AS23649 (1)
> AS24691 (2) AS25139 (1) AS25228 (1)
> AS2609 (7) AS29032 (10) AS29286 (4) AS29465 (1) AS29548 (2)
> AS29835 (4) AS34444 (4) AS35074 (4)
> AS35091 (2) AS41042 (2) AS5377 (10) AS5400 (3) AS5511 (10)
> AS6453 (12) AS8346 (1) AS8452 (212)
> AS8657 (2) AS8668 (1) AS8928 (2)
>
> Detail (
> http://airrs.afrinic.net/bgp/reports.html/bgp.reports.2008-04-28-41.0.0.0.html
> )
>
>
>
> Summary ( 196/8 )
> *******
>
> Prefixes allocated but not seen in the routing table
> (Exact match and more specifics)
> *****************************************************
> 132 Prefixes
>
> 196.1.7.0/24 196.1.26.0/23 196.1.74.0/24 196.1.81.0/24
> 196.1.92.0/24 196.1.93.0/24
> 196.1.94.0/24 196.1.95.0/24 196.1.96.0/24 196.1.97.0/24
> 196.1.98.0/24 196.1.99.0/24
> 196.1.101.0/24 196.1.116.0/23 196.1.118.0/24 196.1.128.0/24
> 196.1.129.0/24 196.1.176.0/20
> 196.2.2.0/24 196.3.58.0/23 196.3.90.0/24 196.3.92.0/23
> 196.3.107.0/24 196.3.108.0/24
> 196.3.109.0/24 196.3.148.0/24 196.3.149.0/24 196.3.150.0/24
> 196.3.154.0/24 196.3.160.0/24
> 196.4.77.0/24 196.4.82.0/24 196.4.85.0/24 196.4.94.0/24
> 196.4.96.0/24 196.4.98.0/24
> 196.4.99.0/24 196.4.162.0/24 196.4.166.0/24 196.4.167.0/24
> 196.4.189.0/24 196.4.200.0/20
> 196.4.249.0/24 196.6.101.0/24 196.6.102.0/24 196.6.173.0/24
> 196.6.248.0/24 196.6.249.0/23
> 196.6.252.0/24 196.6.253.0/24 196.10.1.0/18 196.10.61.0/18
> 196.10.96.0/24 196.10.102.0/23
> 196.10.105.0/24 196.10.142.0/21 196.10.149.0/24 196.10.200.0/24
> 196.10.201.0/24 196.10.202.0/24
> 196.10.225.0/24 196.10.226.0/24 196.10.227.0/24 196.10.230.0/24
> 196.10.232.0/22 196.10.246.0/21
> 196.11.59.0/24 196.11.60.0/24 196.11.61.0/24 196.11.91.0/24
> 196.11.92.0/21 196.11.115.0/24
> 196.11.123.0/24 196.11.198.0/24 196.11.199.0/24 196.11.208.0/24
> 196.11.247.0/24 196.11.248.0/23
> 196.11.252.0/22 196.12.11.0/24 196.13.114.0/24 196.13.120.0/24
> 196.13.147.0/24 196.13.148.0/24
> 196.13.149.0/24 196.13.162.0/24 196.13.166.0/23 196.13.168.0/24
> 196.13.205.0/24 196.13.210.0/24
> 196.13.211.0/23 196.13.218.0/23 196.13.221.0/24 196.13.222.0/24
> 196.13.224.0/24 196.13.226.0/24
> 196.13.227.0/24 196.13.233.0/24 196.13.239.0/24 196.13.240.0/23
> 196.13.246.0/24 196.13.247.0/23
> 196.15.64.0/18 196.16.0.0/14 196.22.4.0/24 196.22.7.0/24
> 196.22.16.0/20 196.22.128.0/24
> 196.22.129.0/24 196.28.0.0/22 196.28.4.0/24 196.28.6.0/24
> 196.29.208.0/20 196.45.64.0/19
> 196.45.164.0/22 196.46.80.0/20 196.46.118.0/23 196.200.208.0/20
> 196.201.2.0/24 196.207.48.0/20
> 196.212.0.0/14 196.216.148.0/22 196.216.152.0/22 196.222.0.0/16
> 196.223.0.0/24 196.223.1.0/24
> 196.223.2.0/24 196.223.3.0/24 196.223.4.0/24 196.223.5.0/24
> 196.223.6.0/24 196.223.7.0/24
>
> Prefixes seen in the routing table
> (Exact match or more specifics)
> *****************************************************
> 1761 prefixes were seen in routing table with the following distribution
>
> * 1272 originated by AS in AfriNIC service region (AS and number of
> prefixes originated)
>
> AS10474 (29) AS10798 (27) AS11157 (1) AS11744 (1) AS11845 (24)
> AS12258 (43) AS12455 (12) AS15022 (2)
> AS15399 (1) AS15706 (30) AS15825 (1) AS16637 (25) AS17148 (17)
> AS17400 (14) AS19711 (1) AS2018 (51)
> AS20484 (30) AS21280 (7) AS21739 (1) AS22355 (1) AS22386 (1)
> AS22572 (4) AS22750 (2) AS23058 (1)
> AS23889 (35) AS24835 (37) AS24863 (130) AS25250 (1) AS25543 (1)
> AS25818 (1) AS26625 (10) AS27576 (8)
> AS27598 (1) AS28683 (1) AS2905 (53) AS29571 (28) AS29918 (1)
> AS29975 (21) AS30429 (1) AS30619 (17)
> AS30983 (1) AS30984 (3) AS30985 (2) AS30986 (1) AS30988 (5)
> AS30989 (1) AS30990 (16) AS30991 (7)
> AS30993 (1) AS30998 (2) AS31810 (11) AS31856 (3) AS32717 (3)
> AS32842 (1) AS33567 (2) AS33762 (3)
> AS33763 (11) AS33765 (4) AS33766 (2) AS33769 (1) AS33771 (3)
> AS33772 (3) AS33774 (10) AS33776 (4)
> AS33777 (21) AS33778 (8) AS33780 (1) AS33782 (1) AS33783 (1)
> AS33785 (1) AS33786 (2) AS33788 (1)
> AS33790 (1) AS36864 (2) AS36865 (6) AS36866 (1) AS36867 (1)
> AS36870 (2) AS36871 (1) AS36873 (3)
> AS36874 (3) AS36877 (6) AS36879 (1) AS36881 (4) AS36882 (3)
> AS36883 (3) AS36884 (2) AS36888 (4)
> AS36889 (8) AS36890 (7) AS36892 (1) AS36893 (1) AS36897 (16)
> AS36898 (6) AS36906 (3) AS36913 (7)
> AS36918 (1) AS36919 (1) AS36922 (3) AS36929 (1) AS36931 (1)
> AS36943 (6) AS36944 (3) AS36948 (1)
> AS36953 (2) AS36959 (4) AS36961 (1) AS36964 (1) AS36975 (1)
> AS36978 (1) AS36980 (1) AS36992 (3)
> AS36995 (1) AS36996 (1) AS37005 (1) AS3741 (178) AS5713 (46)
> AS5734 (1) AS6149 (54) AS6187 (5)
> AS6713 (38) AS7460 (16)
>
> * 489 originated by AS not in AfriNIC service region (AS and number
> of prefixes originated)
>
> AS10292 (2) AS10396 (2) AS11139 (8) AS11300 (1) AS11367 (22)
> AS11868 (1) AS11992 (7) AS12392 (1)
> AS12440 (1) AS12491 (1) AS14217 (6) AS14974 (2) AS15808 (5)
> AS16422 (12) AS16726 (3) AS17175 (18)
> AS17621 (1) AS18895 (16) AS2047 (6) AS21050 (1) AS21120 (2)
> AS21174 (8) AS21491 (10) AS22306 (8)
> AS22351 (58) AS22888 (2) AS22917 (3) AS22999 (1) AS23456 (1)
> AS24753 (1) AS24890 (9) AS25139 (1)
> AS25186 (1) AS25228 (7) AS25233 (4) AS2534 (1) AS25395 (1)
> AS2609 (1) AS26132 (1) AS26452 (1)
> AS2647 (1) AS26608 (4) AS2697 (6) AS27620 (2) AS27681 (1)
> AS27896 (3) AS2830 (1) AS2856 (1)
> AS29286 (5) AS29835 (2) AS30689 (2) AS30969 (9) AS32745 (4)
> AS3356 (1) AS34444 (3) AS3491 (4)
> AS3586 (10) AS3790 (5) AS38538 (1) AS3855 (1) AS39672 (1)
> AS40335 (1) AS40398 (1) AS41042 (4)
> AS41629 (2) AS4515 (3) AS4637 (2) AS5377 (3) AS5400 (2) AS5511
> (3) AS5639 (17) AS6400 (4)
> AS6412 (1) AS6453 (37) AS705 (3) AS7633 (30) AS8220 (1) AS8346
> (5) AS8376 (1) AS8452 (47)
> AS8668 (5) AS8818 (1) AS8841 (7) AS8928 (3) AS9207 (2)
>
> Detail (
> http://airrs.afrinic.net/bgp/reports.html/bgp.reports.2008-04-28-196.0.0.0.html
> )
>
> End of report
> AIRRS Website : http://www.afrinic.net/airrs/index.htm
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> afnog mailing list
>
> End of afnog Digest, Vol 49, Issue 24
> *************************************
>
--
Liban Mohamed
Global One Solution
www.globalonesolutions.net
malabow at gmail.com
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